A. Kuznetsov considered a logic which extended intuitionistic propositional logic by adding a notion of 'irreflexive modality'. We describe an extension of Kuznetsov's logic having the following properties: (a) it is the unique maximal conservative (over intuitionistic propositional logic) extension of Kuznetsov's logic; (b) it determines a new unary logical connective w.r.t. Novikov's approach, i.e., there is no explicit expression within the system for the additional connective; (c) it is axiomatizable by means of one simple additional axiom scheme.

On the ethics of extending human life: healthy people have a right to carry on livingHumanity has long demonstrated a paradoxical ambivalence concerning the extension of a healthy human lifespan. Modest health extension has been universally sought, whereas extreme health extension has been regarded as a snare and delusion—a dream beyond all others at first blush, but actually something we are better off without. The prevailing pace of biotechnological progress is bringing ever closer the day when humanity will be able (...) to act on the latter view by rejecting a clear and present opportunity for much longer healthy lives. Indeed, some biogerontologists contend that that day has already arrived, to the extent that our hesitation in embarking on a vigorous “war on ageing” is already delaying the point at which a cure for ageing will be developed. Here I consider whether our present caution concerning the wisdom of truly curing ageing is likely to survive the increased scrutiny that it will receive in coming years as a result of these technical advances. I conclude that it will not, because of its irreconcilability with values that are more deeply held by the large majority of humanity than any values that argue against the quest for a cure. I further conclude that all the major current reasons given for not curing ageing are mere crutches to help us cope with the immutability of ageing that we have been brought up to accept. Our failure to set aside such irrationality is already shortening potential longevity—quite probably of those already alive today—to a staggering degree. Once we realise this, our determination to consign human ageing to history will be second …. (shrink)

continent. 1.4 (2011): 253—278. A Sense of French Politics Politics itself is not the exercise of power or struggle for power. Politics is first of all the configuration of a space as political, the framing of a specific sphere of experience, the setting of objects posed as "common" and of subjects to whom the capacity is recognized to designate these objects and discuss about them.(1) On April 14, 2011, France implemented its controversial ban of the niqab and burqa , commonly (...) referred to as the Islamic veil, in public places. On the coattails of the 2004 prohibition of religious artifacts, including the less concealing hijab or Islamic headscarves, in schools, the veil ban sparked equal outrage across both political and theological spectra, and many on both sides of the debate were quick to inquire about enforcement. As Steven Erlanger reports, “The police do not have the authority under the law to remove full veils, only to fine or require citizenship lessons for those who violate the new law.”(2) While the legal and social implications of this interdiction are ripe for study, the reprisals for breaking the law, notably compulsory citizenship classes, illuminate the strategic governmentality underlying the French government's targeting of the Muslim community, particularly those elements it considers affiliated with fundamentalist factions and/or terrorist organizations, if only through fashion—an integral component of French citizenship. Indeed, in allowing the (fashion) police to mandate instructional courses in citizenship for offenders, France implies that any Muslim choosing to wear the niqab or burqa , perhaps even for those who are already citizens, must not be aware of the subtle nuances of dress indicative of the French citizenry within public space. Furthermore, the degree of instruction requisite to citizenship, which clearly can and must be updated as the state sees fit, cements the imagined relation between citizens and states within the discourses on the veil ban. As Sharma contends, “Concepts of citizenship are the ideological glue that bonds the nation to the state. Citizenship provides the legal framework through which the state performs its role as ruler for the nation.”(3) Speaking for/as the state, French President Nicolas Sarkozy declared in a 2009 presentation before members of the government and other citizens that the burqa “is not welcome on the territory of France.”(4) Although there is nothing unique, especially recently, about a nation-state taking extreme measures to guard itself against what it deems to be threats to its sovereignty, the way in which the ongoing discourses on hijab have (d)evolved, which coincide with recent pronouncements by governmental leaders in Germany, Britain, and France that policies of multiculturalism have “failed,”(5) points toward nationalist reterritorializations, which is also to say physical and ideological re-appropriations, of public space within democratic milieux, which remain predicated upon the mediation of spaces. As Panagia deduces from Rancière, “Democracy […] is not an institutional form of government […], but an appearance whose visibilities and audibilites arise out of the dissonant blur of the everyday.”(6) Ultimately, the veil ban represents a calculated move to regulate the every day, which is to say the micropolitics of, that which is visible and invisible within French society, which makes it nothing short of a struggle to manage (the sensation of) bodies. Re-situating the political within the context of sense, Rancière argues that the fundamental essence of politics lies within the distinction between consensus and dissensus , and whereas most consider politics proper as fundamentally concerned with the fluid operations of the state— consensus , Rancière actually locates the political within events that disrupt the normative sensory order of things— dissensus . He explains, “Politics revolves around what is seen and what can be said about it, around who has the ability to see and the talent to speak, around the properties of spaces and the possibilities of time.”(7) This reformulation of politics centers on agency and, albeit perhaps unintended, representationality and offers a useful formulation for spatializing the discourses surrounding the Islamic veil, which are mired within seemingly senseless policies and practices of objectification. Instituting a normative “regime of visibility,” the French veil ban encapsulates the political economy of agency, now both mediated and representational, under the rule of nationalist governmentalities in increasingly transnational contexts.(8) Adjudicating presence within public space signals a concern with the sensory aspects of agency itself—what Rancière terms the “distribution of the sensible,” which is “a matrix that defines a set of relations between sense and sense: that is, between a form of sensory experience and an interpretation which makes sense of it.”(9) To be concerned with sense is to focus upon the body, and this somatic repositioning of the (fashionable) citizen within the territory of the state augurs the resurgence of nationalist bio-politics within Europe, since, as Hage explicates, “Nationalism, before being an explicit practice or a mode of classification, is a state of the body. It is a way of imagining one's position within the nation and what one can aspire to as a national.”(10) The French government's attempt to make (bodily) sense of public space for its citizens by and through policies aimed against a burqa-clad Muslim minority, which might only apply to “less then 400 to fewer than 2,000” women(11), reveals the necessary, yet mercurial, transmutation of public space into national space through bio-political strategies of sense-making, which, as Hage observes, denotes that “nationalists perceive themselves as spatial managers.”(12) At the center of this concern over public space is the equally contentious dimension of governing female Islamic identity, which has become one of the main critiques levied against Islam from outsiders who view the veil in its various forms as a clear sign of the religion's actual and symbolic violence against women, even if such critiques remain ensconced within nationalist discourses. As Halim and Meyers argue, “Although Western news media may focus their coverage of Muslim women on the debate over whether and the extent to which the veil may by oppressive to the women who wear it, they have exhibited little interest in the physical oppression of violence against women in Islamic countries.”(13) While it falls outside of the scope of this analysis to arbitrate all of the dimensions of this debate, understanding some of the issues related to female identity and hijab within public space are crucial to this study. As these topics are extraordinarily complex, even and perhaps especially within the Muslim community, it is necessary to provide some context concerning the value, purpose, and meaning of the Islamic veil, which has a rich and arduous history. The Art of the Veil At present, there are only two countries, Iran and Saudi Arabia, that require women to wear hijab , which is a decidedly problematic term and concept whose locus is itself caught within a struggle of sensation. Noting the strategic reterritorialization of the term, Berger explains: The choice of the name, hijab , now widely adopted to designate the “Islamic veil,” it itself interesting, although the semantic shift it operates is not directly commented upon by its users. Although the design (both the cut and the symbolic function) of the hijab and the Iranian chador are indeed the same, as opposed, for instance, to the traditional Algerian haik , the word hijab has come to replace the term chador popularized by the Iranian revolution, as a properly Arabic (hence Koranic) designation. This discursive shift points to the successful reclaiming of the national revolution in Iran by a transnational pan-Islamic movement, whose language of reference can only be Koranic Arabic.(14) While the hijab is certainly a point of contention within various countries dealing with immigrant Islamic populations (of which France has the largest in Europe as part of its colonial legacy in Algeria), it is clear that the veil is a historically contextualized artifact of Muslim identity with a variety of manifestations, even as forces outside of and within Islam seek to codify its actual and symbolic value. Ultimately, the varieties of hijab , including the full-faced burqa and niqab , are complex assemblages of meaning that speak to the multitudinous flows of Islamic identities over time and space. As Gökariksel and McLarney observe, “Wearing a certain style of veil may simultaneously be a disciplinary practice crucial to the cultivation of piety (Mahmood 2005; Gokariksel 2009) and a gendered performance of social distinction in terms of class, taste, and urbanity (White 1999; Navaro-Yashin 2002; Gokariksel and Secor 2009) or of ethnicity and race (Dwyer 1999).”(15) The ideological marketplace from which the varieties of hijab ebb and flow serves both as a reflection of the ever-present materiality and dynamic functionality of spiritual economies, which are derivative of the equally ubiquitous flows of transnational capital driving agency and representationality within our historical moment. Keeping these dual, yet deeply interconnected, capital ecologies as the site of exploration for how the veil is represented within public space, one might begin to sense what lurks behind such veiled agendas. Examining the symbolic and representational nature of the Islamic “veil” in its various forms, this project situates the decidedly political contestations of public space at stake in the French ban alongside recent condemnations of multiculturalism as calculated efforts to re-distribute the sensible so as to valorize national identity within increasingly transnational and globalized socio-economic spaces, which collapse exchange values between distinct, yet interwoven, economies of (cultural/material/spiritual) capital. As the discourses on the veil rely upon representational imag(in)ings, it seems fitting to explore the political economy and art of the veil through the phenomenon of street art, which, much like hijab , is a complex assemblage of meaning of sensation mired in representationality and capital exchange. As street artists have taken up hijab in various forms, the movement offers a lens with which to situate critical responses to the veil debate across both spiritual and material economies. Situating this street art both aesthetically and historically, Lewisohn explains, “'Street art' is a sub-genre of graffiti writing and owes much to its predecessor. Though there is a good deal of crossover between the genres, they are distinct and separate in their own right.”(16) Evolving out of the graffiti explosion of the late 1970's and 1980's, street art broke the unspoken rules of the artistic underground by challenging and re-examining one's sensory experience of art in public space by experimenting with both content and form in ways that harken back to the Situationist International, which as a collective challenged one's experience of urban space through various media and experiential phenomena. Again, Lewisohn observes, “It's important to note street art's break with the tradition of the tag, and its focus on visual symbols that embrace a much wider range of media than graffiti writers would use.”(17) From stencils to prints and murals to one-liners, street artists developed a reputation for critical social and political commentary, and while it is certainly the case that not all street art is intentionally political, in challenging the normative “regime of visibility,” as Rancière puts it, of public space, street artists—even if unconsciously—call into question the common sensory experience of the politics underlying the formation of (nationalist) space.(18) Indeed, Rancière refers to the partisan sensory managers as “police,” who ultimately forge “the rules governing the circulation of appearances, of their visibility and audibility, and the proper distribution of bodies therein.”(19) As such, one can sense that street art's relationship with the police is tenous for a variety of reasons. Writing about his own experience as a street artist, Shepard Fairey observes, “With street art, there's no committee deciding whether I can put my work up on the street, there's no censorship, and I have total freedom of expression, and that concept of freedom is expressed just by using the street as a medium.”(20) As Fairey and other street artists demonstrate, the medium, to paraphrase Marshall McLuhan, is the most glaring aspect of street art's message, and even as it now finds itself in galleries and usurped by private collectors, the ethos of the movement remains relavent to politics as it is, first and foremost, concerned with the configuration and experience of space. Just as examining the punishments for breaking the veil ban can map the terrain of French politics, a representational genealogy of street artist's deployment of hijab and female Muslim identity can assist in mining the depths of public space as a site of bio-political control and contestation in light of recent events in France and the rising tide of anti-multiculturalist rhetoric across Europe, even though the Islamic presence there is radically heterogenous. Using the work of Shepard Fairey, Princess Hijab, br1, and Banksy, this paper sets out to answer a number of key questions concerning the deployment of hijab, and female Islamic identity in particular, within street art as a movement now integral to and critical of the economies of exchange underlying global capitalism, which as a force of influence cannot be underestimated as a driver in the resurgence of nationalist biopolitical governmentalities. Although there exists a litany of artists to choose from, the aforementioned quartet of designers integrate hijab into their work in a seminal and critical fashion, and all have been working with the veil in some way prior to the French ban, which grants some additional context to their usage of it as a symbol in regards to the breakdown of multiculturalism across Europe, even if unconsciously. Although each artist depicts various amalgamations of hijab in their respective corpus, they share common tropes that raise significant questions concerning the veil debate, namely: what are the conditions of possibility for hijab to become a marker of Islamic identity within public space? How can we make sense of the representational topologies within street art's utilization of the hijab and female Islamic identity in light of the French ban? How might these aesthetic imag(in)ings simultaneously inhabit and combat normative discourses concerning hijab , multiculturalism, female Islamic identity, and public space? With these considerations as a backdrop, it is first necessary to outline more fully the hijab as a representative marker of female Islamic identity. The (Veiled) Writing on the Wall

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В книге дается анализ основных характерных признаков русской философии, позволяющие выделить ее как нечто особенное из общего контекста философских культур.

A. D. Smith; VI*—The Self and the Good, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 85, Issue 1, 1 June 1985, Pages 101–118, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristot.

By ‘moral liberty’ Reid means, not freedom to act, but freedom to choose, or to decide. And the choosing he is talking of is an internal something, not the external performance that choosing often is, where it is the executing of one of a number of options—as in the response to “Choose any card from this deck.” Non-human animals sometimes act voluntarily, but those actions “seem to be invariably determined by the passion, or appetite, or affection, or habit, which is (...) strongest at the time.” A voluntary action is for Reid a willed action, i.e., an action done with an object. Even if some animals sometimes perform such actions, they have no power to determine their own wills, no “power of self-government.” Moral liberty is the liberty of a moral agent, his power over the determinations of his will, which requires “not only a conception of what he wills, but some degree of practical judgment or reason.” Moral liberty, then, is “the Liberty of Moral Agents, who are capable of acting well or ill, wisely or foolishly.” Unless we are in that sense free, nothing that we do can be the proper object of blame or approval. (shrink)

An examination of British and French weights exchanged between the Royal Society and the Académie royale des sciences in the 1730s has led to a re‐assessment of the Elizabethan troy standards from the Exchequer and the suggestion that the mass of the troy pound has been revised upwards. In turn this is used to support the idea of an evolutionary relationship between the early bullion ounces of England, France, and the Low Countries.

The different aspects of floral evolution—Angiosperm descent, floral morphology and pollination ecology—are discussed on the basis of the anthocorm theory of the angiospermous flower. Opposed ideas are critically compared and rejected mainly on account of several inconsistencies and flaws in old floral concepts. Floral evolution passed from a very early phase of dicliny, anemophily and aphananthy of the anthocorm to a phase of incipient entomophily soon associated with a partial sex reversal within the anthocorm. This second phase culminated in the (...) monoclinous and primarily zoophilous flower types, whereas other floral types, more particularly the primarily anemophilous, diclinous flowers, are the direct descendants of the anthocorms of the initial phase. The second phase gave rise to at least two morphologically different flower types and two separate semophyletic lines of floral evolution , in each of which the primary zoophily is almost always associated with the development of intrafloral semaphylls usually of androecial derivation. Early flower types were aphananthous and clearly anthocormoid and assumed the morphology and other characteristics of a true flower by contractions, condensations, readjustments, oligomerisations, reductions and modifications leading to the great variety of adaptive floral patterns.Divers aspects de l'évolution de la fleur — à savoir la descendance des Angiospermes, la morphologie de la fleur, et l'écologie de la pollination — sont discutés à partir de l'hypothèse florale de l'anthocorme. Les opinions opposées, après d'être comparées et critisées, sont rejetées principalement à cause des inconséquences et inconsistances des anciens théorèmes morphologiques concernant l'origine de la fleur. L'évolution de la fleur commençait avec une phase d'antan de diclinie, anémophilie et aphananthie, et s'avançait graduellement dans la direction d'une phase entomophilique initiale, bientôt accompagnée d'un renversement de sexe partiel à l'intérieur de l'anthocorm. La deuxième phase culminait vers les types florals monoclines avec zoophilie primaire pendant que des autres types florals, particulièrement les fleurs diclines avec anémophilie primaire, sont les descendants directs du stade initiale de l'anthocorme. A partir de la phase II , au moins deux types florals différents et aussi deux sémophylèses florals séparés se développaient. Dans chacun de ses phases III et III A la zoophilie primaire est presque toujours accouplée avec l'origine des sémaphylles intrafloraux le plus souvent dérivés des étamines. Les anciens types des fleurs ayant été aphanantique et au début encore nettement anthocormoïdes , graduellement prenaient la forme d'une des plusieurs types floraux adaptifs par une contraction de l'axe florale et par l'entassement, l'oligomérisation et la modification des pièces de la fleur.Die drei Aspekte der Evolution der Blüte — die Abstammungsgeschichte der Angiospermen, Blütenmorphologie und Bestäubungsökologie — werden, ausgehend von der Anthokormtheorie der Angiospermenblüte, eingehend besprochen. Entgegengesetzte Meinungen werden kritisch verglichen und hauptsächlich auf Grund mehrerer Strittigkeiten und Fehler der älteren blütenmorphologischen Axiomen abgelehnt. Die Evolution der Blüte fing an mit einer frühen Phase mit Diklinie, Anemophilie und Aphananthie des Anthokorms und schritt allmählich weiter in die Richtung von beginnender Entomophilie, bald mit einer partiellen Geschlechtsinversion innerhalb des Anthokorms zusammengehend. Diese zweite Phase kulminierte in den monoklinen und primär zoophilen Blütentypen, während andere Blütengestalten, besonders die primär anemophilen und diklinen Angiospermenblüten, die unmittelbaren Abkömmlinge der Initialphase des Anthokorms sind. Aus der zweiten Phase entwickelten sich wenigstens zwei morphologisch differenzierte Blütenformen und auch zwei geschiedene Blütensemophylesen , in jeder die primäre Zoophilie fast immer verbunden ist mit der Entwicklung von intrafloralen und meistens von Staubblättern angeleiteten Semaphyllen . Die frühen Blütentypen waren aphanantisch und anfänglich noch deutlich anthokormoid und nahmen allmählich die entgültige Gestalt von einer der vielen adaptiven Blütentypen an durch eine Verkürzung der Blütenachse, und durch ein Zusammendrängen, Oligomerisation und Abänderung der Blütenteile. (shrink)

Volume 46, Issue 6, November 2020, Page 727-743.

The author has recently shown that a mathematical question regarding the fundamental constituents of hardrons cannot be resolved unless the classical axioms of nonfinite mathematics are revised in such a way as to produce a new theory of particle motion in continuous space-time. Under this new theory, the instantaneous position of a moving object has a magnitude that is increasing as the object's velocity. The purpose of this paper is to show that, quite apart from the question of Cantorian axiomatics, (...) the new theory of motion is more consistent with what physicists really believe than the traditional theory of motion. (shrink)